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Criminal Law, Female Virtue, and
the Rise of Liberalism
Wai Chee Dimock*
INTRODUCTION
The contemporary Law and Literature movement has revolved around
a central question, the question of interpretation, offered not only as its
analytic focus but also as its conjectural problematic: as a well-defined
point of convergence between the two disciplines.' In this essay I want
* © Wai Chee Dimock, 1992. This essay was presented at the American Literature Seminar at
Yale University. I thank Richard Brodhead, Carla Kaplan, Bryan Wolf, and other members of the
seminar for their stimulating comments.
1. For accounts of the law and literature movement, see Robert Weisberg, "The Law-Literature
Enterprise," Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 1 (1988): 1-67; Brook Thomas, "Reflections on
the Law and Literature Revival," Critical Inquiry 17 (1991): 510-39. On the liberties and hazards of
interpretation, see Owen Fiss, "Objectivity and Interpretation," Stanford Law Review 34 (1982):
739-63. For arguments that emphasize the analogy between law and literature, see Ronald Dworkin,
"Law as Interpretation," Critical Inquiry 9 (1982), reprinted in The Politics of Interpretation, ed. W.
J. T. Mitchell (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1983), 249-70; James Boyd White, Heracles' Bow:
Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of the Law (Madison, Wis.: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1985);
Sanford Levinson, "Law and Literature," in Interpreting Law and Literature, ed. Sanford Levinson
and Steven Mailloux (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1988), 155-74. For arguments against a
simple conflation of law and literature, see Gerald Bruns, "Law as Hermeneutics: A Response to
Ronald Dworkin," in The Politics of Interpretation, 315-20; Walter Benn Michaels, "Against
Formalism: Chickens and Rocks," in Interpreting Law and Literature, 215-28; Joseph Vining,
"Generalization in Interpretive Theory," Representations 30 (1990): 1-12.
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to explore a different point of convergence, somewhat less well-defined,
marked not by the overlapping concerns of legal and literary hermeneu-
tics but by the interlocking relations of legal and literary history. This
focus-on the historical and historically shifting relations between law
and literature--opens up a different set of questions: questions about the
alignment of institutions within a cultural order, about the evolving
boundaries between adjacent domains, and about the possibility of
residual formations supplementary to emergent ones. Focusing more
specifically on the nineteenth-century novel, on its language of gender-a
language not only robustly punitive on the subject of female virtue, but
also robustly figurative in its ability to shadow forth the broadly prescrip-
tive within the narrowly punitive-I analyze this signifying latitude both
as a residual supplement to the contracting boundaries of the criminal
law and as an index to the more general problems of polity and morality
in the transition from classical republicanism to modern liberalism.
I. CRIMINAL LAW AND THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY NOVEL:
JURISDICTIONS AND SEMANTICS
In 1703, Adam Latham, a laborer, and Joan Mills, wife to another
laborer, were brought before the county court in Kent County, Dela-
ware, charged with fornication and adultery. For punishment, Joan
Mills was publicly whipped, twenty-one lashes on her bare back, well
applied, followed by one year in prison at hard labor. Adam Latham was
sentenced to twenty lashes. This was not the first time the two had got-
ten into trouble. Adam, indeed, had been charged once before with the
same crime, "the Sin of Incontinency and fornication," but he had been
acquitted then; the court ordered him only to post bond guaranteeing
good behavior. Now that he had broken his word, he had to endure not
only physical punishment but also the public disgrace of "wear[ing] a
Roman T on his left arme on the Outside of his uppermost garment...
for the space of six months next."2
As a forerunner of Hester Prynne, and a male one to boot, Adam
Latham has some claim to our attention, although we should also note
that his ordeal was in no way out of the ordinary. Indeed, for all its
colorful pathos, the trial of this unfortunate but apparently unpenitent
couple was, in fact, relatively unremarkable, as trials of this type were
one of the most familiar sights in the colonial courtroom. In the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, offenses against morality (which meant
sexual offenses, for the most part) were classified as criminal offenses;
they came under the jurisdiction of penal statutes and were routinely
2. Court Records of Kent County, Delaware, 1680-1705, at 234-35, 270-71 (L. de Valinger ed.
1959), recounted in Lawrence Friedman, "Notes Toward a History of American Justice," Buffalo
Law Review 24 (1974): 111.
[Vol. 4: 209
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prosecuted. In eighteenth-century Pennsylvania, the penalty for the
third adultery conviction was twenty-one lashes, seven years in jail, and
marking with an "A" on the forehead.3 Even harsher measures prevailed
elsewhere. The Massachusetts Code of 1648 made adultery a capital
offense. 4 The Duke's Laws of 1665 in New York had a similar provi-
sion.' The death sentence was in fact rarely invoked-the harsh penalty
being a matter of some dispute-but lesser punishments such as whip-
ping, forfeiture, fines, and imprisonment were standard measures,
because, according to the legal thinking of the seventeenth century,
moral offenses carried a criminal liability, appropriately enforceable by
courtroom action.6 William Nelson, studying judicial government in
colonial Massachusetts, reports that between 1760 and 1774, a total of
2,784 prosecutions came before the Superior and General Sessions
Courts, and that among these, 1,074 were for sexual misconduct (the
bulk of which were fornication). In other words, offenses against moral-
ity accounted for as much as 38 percent of all prosecutions and made up
the single largest category of crime. 7 This astonishing fact had some-
thing to do, no doubt, with the proverbial zealotry of the Massachusetts
Bay colony, but, as we can see in the trial and tribulation of Adam
Latham and Joan Mills, even in Delaware (as well as in New York,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia), crimes against morality were
arraigned in the courtroom no less than in the pulpit. At once reprehen-
sible and indictable, they were subject not only to divine retribution, but
also to criminal prosecution.8
The lack of separation here between morality and legality, or, as was
more often the case, between immorality and criminality, points to a
judicial universe recognizably different from our own. What has tran-
spired in the three hundred and fifty years separating us from colonial
America is nothing less than a transformation of the legal paradigm, a
transformation reflected not merely in the content of the law, but, more
3. Lawrence H. Gipson, Crime and Punishment in Provincial Pennsylvania (Bethlehem, Pa.:
Lehigh Univ. Press, 1935), 7.
4. The Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts, 1641-1691, ed. John D. Cushing, 3 vols.
(Wilmington, Del: Scholarly Resources, 1976), 1: 12.
5. The Colonial Laws of New York from the Year 1664 to the Revolution (Albany: J.B. Lyon,
State Printer, 1894), I: 21. Cited in David H. Flaherty, "Law and the Enforcement of Morals in
Early America," Perspectives in American History 5 (1971): 213.
6. Flaherty, "Law and the Enforcement of Morals," 203-53.
7. William E. Nelson, The Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on
Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1975), 37. For a
discussion of Nelson (along with Morton Horwitz and John Phillip Reid) in the context of the new
legal history, see Hendrik Hartog, "Distancing Oneself from the Eighteenth Century: A
Commentary on Changing Pictures of American Legal History," in Law in the American Revolution
and the Revolution in the Law, ed. Hendrik Hartog (New York: New York Univ. Press, 1981), 229-
57.
8. For findings that support Flaherty's and Nelson's, see Michael S. Hindus, Prison and
Plantation: Crime, Justice, and Authority in Massachusetts and South Carolina, 1767-1878 (Chapel
Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1980), 48-51; George Dargo, Law in the New Republic (New
York: Knopf, 1983), 25-27.
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fundamentally still, in its range of enforceable meanings, in its designated
sphere of operation, and in its infrastructural relation to other mecha-
nisms of justice. In the field of criminal law, this transformation of the
legal paradigm changes the way "crime" itself is defined. What counts as
a crime, what suffices as punishment, who is charged with its administra-
tion, and how that specific penalty must accord with the general prohibi-
tion-these taxonomic and jurisdictional changes are the very ground
upon which the criminal law might be said to have a history.
Writing about a comparable shift in taxonomy and jurisdiction in sev-
enteenth-century English law, Christopher Hill has described the aboli-
tion of church courts as an "intellectual and moral revolution."9 What
ensued, according to Hill, was a growing sensitivity about the question of
boundaries, a growing separation between legal and ecclesiastical disci-
pline, and a growing distinction between sin and crime. Hill's focus here
on the question of boundaries-on the shifting lines of demarcation
between adjacent jurisdictions, and between overlapping categories of
offense-is crucial in any historical theorizations about the law: theoriza-
tions about the shape it comes to take, the place it comes to occupy, and
the neighboring forms with which it comes to be affiliated in an institu-
tional landscape. Following his lead, we too might want to direct our
focus, not on the legal domain as it is currently composed, but on the
changing contours of its composition: on the fit (or the lack of fit)
between categories of the law and categories of ethical judgment.
Between the reprehensible and the prosecutable, between what is con-
demned as sin and what is punished as crime, there is a margin of dis-
crepancy, historically variable and historically significant.'" The history
of such variations casts light not only on the law and its functions and
limits at any particular moment, but also on the larger social structure of
that particular moment, within which the law comes to acquire such
functions and limits.
Indeed, what we witness in the colonial courtroom is precisely the
absence (or at least the minimal presence) of such a margin of discrep-
ancy. Sin and crime were more or less synonymous in colonial America,
synonymous and coextensive. Because sin was readily translatable into
and enforceable as crime, the problem of jurisdictional boundaries was
neither very acute nor even very meaningful. Thus, when a Massachu-
9. Christopher Hill, Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England (New York: Schocken
Books, 1964), 343.
10. Douglas Hay has argued, for example, that a margin of discretion in eighteenth-century
English law enabled the ruling classes to demonstrate magnanimity to and exact deference from the
lower orders. See his "Property, Authority, and the Criminal Law," in Albion s Fatal Tree: Crime
and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975), 17-54. But see also
John H. Langbein's critique of such a concept, in his "Albion's Fatal Flaw," Past and Present 98
(1983): 96-120. For the uses of discretion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see
Lawrence Friedman, "History, Social Policy, and Criminal Justice," in Social History and Social
Policy, ed. David Rothman and Stanton Wheeler (New York: Academic Press, 1981), 204-15.
[Vol. 4: 209
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setts law of 1665 referred to fornication as "a particular Crime, a shame-
ful Sin, much increasing amongst us,"" the apposition of the two
words-"Sin" and "Crime"-reveals no uneasiness, no sense of possible
incompatibility, but rather the assurance of a clear connection, so clear
that it seemed not a connection at all, but an identity.
By contrast, the modernity and liberalness of our own legal culture
resides in the collapse of that assurance. The connection between sin and
crime, so calmly assumed by the Massachusetts lawmakers of 1665, is
now a subject that inspires anything but calmness. In the context of
homosexual practices, for example, passions have flared up on just this
point. "What is the connexion between crime and sin and to what
extent, if at all, should the criminal law of England concern itself with
the enforcement of morals and punish sin or immorality as such?" This
was the question put forth by Lord Devlin, a distinguished writer on
criminal law and a leading protagonist in the contemporary debate about
law and morals. 2 The question was loaded, for its occasion was the con-
troversial appearance of the 1957 Report by the Committee on Homosex-
ual Offenses and Prostitution (commonly known as the Wolfenden
Report), which, in no uncertain language, had denounced any attempt
"to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin." "There must be a realm
of morality and immorality," the Report said, a realm "which is, in brief
and crude terms, not the law's business."' 3 Lord Devlin disagreed. He
strongly objected to the Report's separation of "crime and sin, the divine
law from the secular, and the moral from the criminal." For him, "the
criminal law [must] overlap the moral law," because the two "happen to
cover the same area."
14
Such a position has not gone unchallenged. Indeed, Lord Devlin him-
self has subsequently emerged as an object of criticism in the hands of
some formidable opponents, including H. L. A. Hart and Ronald Dwor-
kin. 5 Behind these critics stands the venerable tradition of analytical
jurisprudence-from Jeremy Bentham to John Stuart Mill and John
Austin-a tradition whose central tenet (in the words of Austin) is that
"[tihe tendency to confound law and morals is one of the most prolific
11. The Colonial Laws of Massachusetts, reprinted from the edition of 1672, ed. William H.
Whitmore (Boston, 1887), 54-55. Quoted in Flaherty, "Law and the Enforcement of Morals," 209.
12. Patrick Lord Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959), 2.
Delivered as the Maccabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence at the British Academy, this was first
published in 1959.
13. The Wolfenden Report. Quoted in Devlin, Enforcement, 3.
14. Devlin, Enforcement, 3, 5.
15. H. L. A. Hart, Law, Liberty, and Morality (Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1963), 16-19, 28-
70; for a less strong claim, see Ronald Dworkin, "Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals,"
Yale Law Journal 75 (1966): 986-1005. The relation between law and morality is important not just
for criminal law but also for constitutional law. See "Symposium: Law, Community, and Moral
Reasoning," California Law Review 77 (1989): 475-594, for a discussion occasioned by Bowers v.
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sources of jargon, darkness and perplexity." 6 The determination not to
succumb to such jargon, darkness, and perplexity was one of the
impulses behind legal change in the nineteenth century, and, by and
large, it was an impulse that prevailed. By the time Oliver Wendell
Holmes set out, in his celebrated 1897 essay, "The Path of the Law," to
"dispel a confusion between morality and law," he was speaking from a
mainstream position. "The law is full of phraseology drawn from
morals," Holmes said, and "continually invites us to pass from one
domain to the other." He wished that "every word of moral significance
could be banished from the law altogether," so that we might "rid our-
selves of an unnecessary confusion." Conceding that there might be
"some plausibility to the proposition that the law, if not a part of moral-
ity, is limited by it," he insisted, nonetheless, that "this limit of power is
not coextensive with any system of morals." 7
Indeed, in the course of the nineteenth century, the coextension of law
and morality-and the coincidence of sin and crime-was effectively
brought to an end. Criminal prosecutions for moral offenses declined
sharply after the Revolution-to an average of 11 cases per year between
1786 and 1790, and to fewer than 5 cases per year in the four decades
thereafter.1 8 The moral domain was quietly slipping out from under the
law's jurisdiction, now increasingly construed as a limited arena. It is a
telling sign that, during this period, the law was frequently described as a
bounded enclosure, as a "sphere," a "realm," an "area," or a "province,"
the last word figuring conspicuously in the title of John Austin's influen-
tial lectures, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined. The law was
spatialized in the nineteenth century; it had a specific locale and a specific
set of boundaries. Henceforth its sphere of operation was to be narrow,
precise, and sharply delimited. Its enforceable meanings were to be
''compressed to the smallest possible compass [its] language would
bear."' 9 Against this background-against this contraction in semantics
as in applicability-it is not surprising that, in his celebrated essay, Oli-
ver Wendell Holmes should choose the word "path" to characterize the
legal domain, for narrowness and linearity were indeed the defining
16. John Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, and The Uses of the Study of
Jurisprudence, ed. H. L. A. Hart (New York: Noonday Books, 1954), 371. For a twentieth-century
elaboration of Bentham's and Austin's positions, see H. L. A. Hart, "Positivism and the Separation
of Law and Morals," Harvard Law Review 71 (1958): 593-629; for a response to Hart, see Lon
Fuller, "Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart," Harvard Law Review 71
(1958): 630-72. For a Kantian (as opposed to utilitarian) argument for the separation of law and
morals, see George P. Fletcher, "Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective," Columbia Law Review
87 (1987): 533-58.
17. Oliver Wendell Holmes, "The Path of the Law," Harvard Law Review 10 (1897): 459, 464,
460.
18. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law, 110.
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attributes of "the law [taken] as a business with well understood limits, a
body of dogma enclosed within definite lines."
2 °
The contracting boundaries of the law gave rise to an interesting gray
area, no longer covered by the rigor of penal statutes, but not without an
alternative form of prohibition. If penal justice would henceforth limit
itself to the specifically criminal, rather than to the generally immoral,
how was the latter to be maintained as an intelligible category? What
persuasive or corrective instruments must it summon forth? And, if sin
no longer provided the legal basis for criminalization, what other func-
tions might it continue to perform? In what context, and with what
resonances, would such a concept continue to have meaning?
After all, we in the late twentieth century are all familiar with the
boldly advertised "sinfulness" of rich desserts, a usage that points to a
dramatic shift in reference-at once a spreading out and thinning out of
meaning-which completely transforms a word whose semantic contents
had once been narrow, literal, and unambiguous. This semantic transfor-
mation, I argue, had its roots in the nineteenth century, in the growing
separation between judicial and nonjudicial categories, especially the
growing separation between sin and crime. This, together with the relax-
ation of religious discipline, effectively dislodged sin from its customary
moorings. No longer anchored to a formal system of punishment, sin
became, instead, a floating signifier. It became the bearer of an extralegal
set of meanings and lent its weight to an extralegal structure of
prohibition.
This extralegal area-newly removed from the purview of the law, but
residually connected to it, and perhaps continually supplementary to it-
ought to be of special interest to literary critics; for it is in this gray area,
this unofficial realm of prohibition, partly overdetermined but partly
indeterminate, that we might be able to observe some of the most impor-
tant functions of the novel. Here I have in mind the recent hypothesis,
advanced by D. A. Miller, John Bender, and Richard Brodhead, among
others, about the possibility, amenability, and efficacy of the novel as an
instrument of social discipline.2" I want to test this hypothesis by focus-
ing on a set of (admittedly speculative) genetic conditions for the novel,
conditions having to do with the redrawing of boundaries and the trans-
fer of jurisdiction from law to literature. To summarize my argument
briefly, what concerns me here is something like a division of signifying
labor: on the one hand, the impulse toward precision in the criminal law
gave it an ever-diminishing range of reference; on the other hand, the
20. Holmes, "The Path of the Law," 459.
21. D. A. Miller, "The Novel and the Police," Glyph 8 (1981): 127-47; also The Novel and the
Police (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1987); John Bender, Imagining the Penitentiary
(Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1987); Richard Brodhead, "Sparing the Rod: Discipline and
Fiction in Antebellum America," Representations 21 (1988): 67-96.
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impulse toward amplitude in the novel gave it a continuing (or perhaps
even expanding) capacity for symbolization. Unlike criminal justice,
whose operative terms were to become specific and explicit, without
nuance or ambiguity, the novel's poetic justice remained allusive. And,
unlike the canon of strict construction in criminal law, which limits the
"punishable" to its narrowest possible meaning, poetic justice in the
novel-a canon of the broadest construction-works in almost exactly
the opposite way, incorporating under the category of the "punishable"
deeds that would not be so considered by any jurists and devising for
their penance an entire repertoire of afflictions.
The relation between law and literature that I am suggesting here,
then, is tangential (and perhaps even antithetical) to the ones more cus-
tomarily proposed, including those offered by the early commentators on
the novel. When Hazlitt said of Richardson that "he sets about describ-
ing every object and transaction, as if the whole had been given in on
evidence by an eye-witness," and when Charles Lamb said that reading
Defoe "is like reading evidence in a court of Justice,"22 what they had in
mind was the palpable affinity between two descriptive surfaces: between
the minute details of legal evidence and the minute details of novelistic
portraiture. What concerns me, however, is not so much the affinity
between the two surfaces as a discrepancy between what is inscribed or
intimated in each. It is this discrepancy-between their figurative width
or density, between the self-imposed singularity of reference in criminal
law and the self-flaunting multiplicity of reference in the novel-that
makes law and literature two different enterprises, two different signify-
ing environments, generating different meanings for what counts as a
crime and what is deemed an appropriate punishment.
To put this another way, by the early nineteenth century, criminal law
had become (or was trying to become) a nonsymbolic field, its action
restricted to "the unvarnished meaning of its words," so that "only those
acts ought to be crimes which were plainly so labeled."23  The
desymbolization of the law-and the new, invisible forms of discipline
that it occasioned-is of course the subject of Michel Foucault's Disci-
pline and Punish,24 a work that has inspired literary critics to see narra-
tive fiction as one such form of discipline, a form roughly homologous to
that of the school, the prison, and the police. This approach-one that
emphasizes the converging functions of the social and the literary-is
certainly one plausible account of the novel's cultural work; and yet,
22. William Hazlitt, Lectures on the English Comic Writers (1819; rpt. New York: Wiley and
Putnam, 1845), 138; Charles Lamb, letter to Walter Wilson, Dec. 16, 1822, in the latter's Memoirs of
the Life and Times of Daniel Defoe, 3 vols. (London: Hurst, Chance, 1830), III: 428. Both are
quoted in Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1957), 34.
23. Friedman, A History of American Law, 291.
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there is no necessary reason why such cultural work should inhere in a
relation of homology. It is equally possible to argue the opposite, I think,
locating the novel's function not in the extent to which it replicates social
forms, but in the extent to which it complements, and hence diverges
from, those forms. What is especially worth investigating, from this per-
spective, is the possibility of an alternative form of justice in the novel:
one that maintains a different referential relation between a specific
offense and its range of culpable associations, and between a specific pen-
alty and its range of vicarious prohibitions.
In short, what I want to emphasize here is a functional discrepancy
between the jurisdiction of law and the jurisdiction of literature, a func-
tional noncoincidence of boundaries. Because "crime" retains a semantic
fluidity in the novel, what prevails here is definitely not the path of the
law, but something more like a "field": a field of punitive conventions,
accommodating and interconnecting a range of signifying registers. Like
an echo chamber, these conventions set into motion a far more complex
series of resonances than do their counterparts in criminal law. They
body forth an entire spectrum of prescriptions and proscriptions, some
having to do with the law and others not. They speak to anxieties
explicit and implicit. And, as they pass judgment on the culpable, they
also symbolically reconstitute a normative ground, inferable from the
culpable but not simply the obverse of it, since the normative ground is
wider than any specific act it deems blameworthy.
Given this expansive normative horizon, the justice that the novel dis-
penses is "justice" most liberally constructed; justice not only in the nar-
row sense of retributive justice, an order affecting one particular person,
but also in the broadest sense, what political philosophers call "distribu-
tive justice," an order affecting many diverse persons. Distributive jus-
tice is in fact the operative grounds of an entire polity, regulating its
general apportionment of burdens and benefits.2" Indeed, as I will try to
argue, the novel's signifying latitude is most crucial in the symbolic
exchange it facilitates between these two senses of justice: between an
ethics of distribution and an ethics of retribution, between a general
problem of commensurability in collective life and a specific problem of
commensurability in personal conduct.
II. GENDERED JUSTICE
The penal field in the novel is a symbolic field in which a range of
discourses are substituted for and sometimes superimposed one another.
Multiplicity (rather than linearity) marks the novel's referential network,
and, within this circulatory medium, it is difficult (and unwise) to impute
25. For the centrality of distribution to a concept of justice, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
(Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971), 4-11.
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a telos to the signifying process. Still, it is not hard to see that gender is
one of the busiest routes of reference in the novel. The language of gen-
der, Nancy Armstrong has argued, might be the novel's supreme inven-
tion, at once its signatory voice and its regulatory instrument.26 This is
especially true in the field of punitive conventions, where we find a lan-
guage not only explicitly sexualized, but sexualized in such a way as to
dramatize the bounds of propriety as well as its overt or covert infrac-
tions. The language of gender conveys not just the usual symbolic
freight, but symbolic freight of a particularly incriminating nature. In
fact, we need only look at the harsh fate visited upon the heroines of the
nineteenth-century novel, from Hester Prynne to Hetty Sorrel, to be
impressed not only by the centrality of crime and punishment, but also
by the extent to which this phenomenon is sexually predicated, the extent
to which poetic justice is gendered justice.
Within this tradition, James Fenimore Cooper's The Deerslayer must
stand as an exceptionally salient example, closing resoundingly with the
word "crimes."27 The fate of the criminal, Judith Hutter, is no less
resounding: she is emphatically punished by being denied Natty
Bumppo, the one man she wants. As Cooper's many authorial com-
ments suggest, that punishment is not at all an afterthought, a mechani-
cal contrivance, or a random occurrence, but the central burden of the
novel. In the Preface, he characterizes his heroine as one "filled with the
pride of beauty, erring, and fallen." His hero, Natty Bumppo, on the
other hand, is known "principally for his sincerity, his modesty, and his
unerring truth and probity." Between the "erring" woman and the
"unerring" man, one manifestly "fallen" and the other manifestly not,
the outcome seems predictable enough: "beauty, delirious passion, and
sin" will all come to naught, and the retribution visited upon them, the
author assures us, will "be sufficiently distinct to convey its moral."2
The unabashed presence of the word "sin" (and its conspicuous place-
ment in the Preface) gives more than a hint of the novel's punitive flavor.
We get another hint at the end of the book, in the penultimate paragraph,
when Cooper proceeds to sum up what he calls the "history of crime"-
by which he apparently means the miscellaneous misdeeds of the
Hutters:
Time and circumstances have drawn an impenetrable mystery
around all else connected with the Hutters. They lived, erred, died,
26. Nancy Armstrong, Desire and Domestic Fiction: A Political History of the Novel (New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1987).
27. The last sentence of The Deerslayer reads as follows: "We live in a world of transgressions
and selfishness, and no pictures that represent us otherwise can be true, though, happily for human
nature, gleamings of that pure spirit in whose likeness man has been fashioned are to be seen,
relieving its deformities and mitigating if not excusing its crimes." James Fenimore Cooper, The
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and are forgotten .... The history of crime is ever revolting, and it
is fortunate that few love to dwell on its incidents. The sins of the
family have long since been arraigned at the judgment seat of God,
or are registered for the terrible settlement of the last great day.
29
With a semantic latitude strikingly reminiscent of colonial usage, Cooper
puts on trial not only "crimes" but also "sins," as if the two were synony-
mous (and throwing in, for good measure, the word "err," clearly a
favorite of his, and apparently to be equated with "sin" and "crime").
The imprecision here is telling, and tellingly evocative of a judicial uni-
verse in which the boundaries between the moral and the legal, between
"sin" and "crime," remain as yet undefined, as yet unproblematic.
Crime is a hospitable category here. Within its precincts we find not a
single individual (as Cooper's account of his heroine might have led us to
believe), but the Hutters as a unit, the whole family evidently guilty of
some misdeed. Not just Thomas Hutter, a former pirate, but also his
wife, a fallen woman like her daughter Judith, and not just Judith herself,
but also her half-witted sister, Hetty-these four figures, otherwise quite
distinct, are nonetheless united in their joint culpability, in what Cooper
generically calls "the sins of the family."
In what sense might the Hutters be understood as a collectivity, as a
family of sinners? Since it is their kinship that the novel emphasizes, we
might do well to ponder their crimes in generic terms. To be sure,
Thomas Hutter was once a pirate and his sins might have been crimes
even in a legal sense; and Judith, a fallen woman, has of course sinned in
the most time-honored fashion. Still, beyond these discrete categories of
offense, something more encompassing, and perhaps more deep-seated,
remains. Indeed, given the Hutters' kinship in crime (not to say kinship
in punishment), we should perhaps be alert to a curious coincidence here
between the kind of "sins" the Hutters are said to have committed and
the kind of family they represent: a coincidence between their profile as
sinners and their profile as a familial unit.
What kind of family are the Hutters? Once we put the question that
way, it becomes immediately clear that something is wrong, not just with
the Hutter family but with the Hutters as a family. This family turns out
not to be a family after all, as Thomas Hutter is revealed to be quite
unrelated to his putative daughters. Judith, one of those daughters, is
overjoyed at this turn of events. "I scarce know by what name to call
myself now!" she exclaims with some delight. "I am Judith, and Judith
only, until the law gives me a right to another name. Never will I use
that of Thomas Hutter again." Judith's name and, by extension, her
family, are now matters of her own choosing. As she explains to Hetty:
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that, too, am I glad and proud, for she was a mother to be proud of-but
Father was not father!"3°
For Judith, the unfathering of Thomas Hutter brings only elation.
Hetty, on the other hand, is quite distressed. If fathers can stop being
fathers-if one familial identity can dissolve so completely into thin air-
what is there to prevent other identities from following suit? What is
there to prevent sisters, for example, from turning into total strangers?
"How do I know, Judith, that you wouldn't be as glad to find that I
am not your sister as you are in finding that Thomas Hutter, as you
call him, was not your father? I am only half-witted, and few people
like to have half-witted relations; and then I'm not handsome-at
least, not as handsome as you-and you may wish a handsomer
sister."31
Hetty's worries here are local and personal, but they give voice as well to
a general anxiety regarding the modern form of life, with its emphasis on
elective identities and voluntary attachments. This modern form of life,
based not on lineage but on inclination, not on blood but on "wishes,"
challenges the very foundations of the traditional order, its grounds for
both classification and association. In the Hutter family that ceases to be
a family, we see, dramatized in caricature, the historical shift from paren-
tal control to filial autonomy, from a classical world of hereditary edicts
to a liberal society of individual preferences.32 What Cooper collectively
condemns in the Hutters-what he labels the "sins of the family"-
might, then, also be understood as their sin against the family, that is,
their sin against a traditional social order.
Sins of this sort do not go unpunished, and, in this case, the wages of
sin suitably mirror the sins themselves. Having disowned one parent,
however undesirable, and repudiated one identity, however inauthentic,
Judith is now in danger of being left with no father at all, and no identity
to speak of. Nor is she without forewarning. Her lack of filial regard has
shocked even Hurry Harry, the most mindless of characters, into a kind
of blind prophecy: "Not Thomas Hutter's darter! Don't disown the old
fellow in his last moments, Judith, for that's a sin the Lord will never
overlook. If you're not Thomas Hutter's darter, whose darter be you?"3 3
The question is ominously put. And lest we miss the point, Cooper
hastens to tell us, even more ominously, that, "in getting rid of a parent
whom she felt it was a relief to find she might own she had never loved,
30. Ibid., 403, 361.
31. Ibid., 361.
32. See, for example, Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England 1500-1800
(New York: Harper & Row, 1977); Jay Fliegelman, Prodigals and Pilgrims: The American
Revolution against Patriarchal Authority, 1750-1800 (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982); Jan
Lewis, The Pursuit of Happiness: Family and Values in Jefferson's Virginia (New York: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 1983), 187-203.
33. Cooper, The Deerslayer, 349.
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[Judith] overlooked the important circumstance that no substitute was
ready to supply his place." One might point out, of course, that it is not
Judith's fault that she has not found a substitute for Thomas Hutter; she
certainly tries hard enough. Her mother has made it impossible for her,
having made sure that "[a]ll the dates, signatures, and addresses had
been cut from the letters .... Thus Judith found all her hopes of ascer-
taining who her parents were defeated."34
But the mother has "defeated" the daughter in a less tangible way as
well. Judith's problem, after all, is not so much that she has failed tofind
a father as that she has never had one she can claim. Her problem is not
unverifiable genealogy, but all too verifiable bastardy. Still, this handicap
notwithstanding, it is conceivable that Judith could have found a substi-
tute for Hutter, not by discovering a true father, but by acquiring a true
husband, who, in giving her his name, would have bestowed upon her
that which her own father had neglected to bestow. But, as we know,
this "substitute" too is not Judith's to have. In the last paragraph of the
book, we are treated to a curious bit of rumor about Sir Robert Warley,
Judith's old paramour, that he now "lived on his paternal estates and
that there was a lady of rare beauty in the lodge who had great influence
over him, though she did not bear his name."
35
Judith's crime is the crime of anonymity. She is the leading offender,
but she is not alone. Indeed, her crime is such that we can safely assume
a host of accomplices and a host of precursors. The illegitimate daughter
of one man, Judith will in time become the illegitimate consort of
another. She is the daughter of a sinning mother, and she will grow up to
sin in exactly the same fashion. Sin here is generic and periodic, a family
romance, a phenomenon hereditary and repeating. Such a criminal
sequence rests on a kind of generational fungibility, equating father and
husband, givers of names who withhold what they have to give, and
mother and daughter, bearers of names who fail to receive what they are
socially obliged to bear. It is surely appropriate (if not downright heavy-
handed) that Judith should be named after her mother: she is a second
Judith, a reincarnation of the first.
Judith's sin, then, is neither local nor unique. It is exemplary and syn-
ecdochic, it beckons backward and outward, compounding and com-
pressing into its orbit the sins of others. Nor is the transgression here
purely sexual, however convenient a label that might afford. Indeed, just
as Judith stands in for a family of sinners, so her misdeed encompasses a
spectrum of the reprehensible. No longer a maiden but not yet a wife,
she has forfeited not just a proper sexual identity, but any identity at all.
As the novel administers to her a suitable dose of punishment, it also
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chastises, through her example, a cluster of offenses having generally to
do with the problem of identity: not just the misadventures of the sexual
persona but also the vicissitudes of the social persona, not just deviation
from sexual purity but also ambition in social mobility.
III. SYMBOLIC PUNISHMENT: FIGURATIONS OF GENDER AND CLASS
Judith's sexual failing is thus a metaphor, a pivotal juncture, where
punishment is meted out both literally and figuratively, both to a specific
crime plainly so labelled and to an unspecified range of guilty cognates.
We might think of it as a point of symbolic inscription, and it is useful to
remind ourselves of its substitutive and supplementary relation to other
signifying categories. Eve Sedgwick has observed that "[tihe subject of
sex [is] an especially charged leverage-point, or point for the exchange of
meanings, between gender and class."36 Eva Kittay, writing more gener-
ally about metaphor as a cognitive principle, has argued that the
exchange of meaning that it brings about is not just between two discrete
terms, but between two semantic fields, two domains of meanings, the
structural relations of one transposed upon the other.37 This "field the-
ory" of metaphor usefully sums up the punitive workings of the novel,
for in the novel it is the exchange of meaning across fields-the symbolic
transfer of cause and culpability-that constitutes not only the character
of the "criminal" but the very ground for punishment.
It might seem odd to speak of the punitive as a metaphoric field, yet
Emile Durkheim, linking penal law to a residual religiosity, has alerted
us to just this "metaphorical" dimension (although, as he also says, "the
metaphor is not. without truth").3" Durkheim argues that a crime is
always "an offense against an authority in some way transcendent" and,
in avenging a wrong, in demanding that "the culpable ought to suffer
because he has done evil and in the same degree," we are propelled by
"an echo in us of a force which is foreign to us, and which is superior to
that which we are."3 9 As the enforcement of an "echo," punishment is
symbolic and projective; it bespeaks a metaphoric frame of mind.' ° This
is certainly true of the "retributionists," who justify punishment on the
ground of expiation; and, with slight modification, it is true even of the
36. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Between Men: English Literature and Male Homosocial Desire
(New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1985), 11.
37. Eva Feder Kittay, Metaphor: Its Cognitive Force and Linguistic Structure (New York:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987).
38. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, trans. George Simpson (New York: Free
Press, 1964), 101.
39. Ibid., 85, 88, 100.
40. For more recent discussions of the punitive and the symbolic, see Joel Feinberg, "The
Expressive Function of Punishment," The Monist 49 (1965): 397-408; Joseph Gusfield, "Moral
Passage: The Symbolic Process in Public Designation of Deviance," Social Problems 15 (1968): 175-
88. For an interesting argument in favor of "blaming" as a mode of communal signification, see
James Boyd White, "Criminal Law as a System of Meaning," in Heracles' Bow, 192-214.
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secular-minded utilitarians, who justify punishment on the ground of
deterrence."' As "deterrence," punishment is understood not as an end
in itself, not as an infliction of pain for the sake of inflicting pain, but as a
means to an end, an infliction of pain to make all further inflictions
unnecessary. As Bentham puts it, the "first object" of punishment is "to
prevent, in as far as it is possible, and worth while, all sorts of offences
whatsoever; in other words, so to manage, that no offence whatsoever
may be committed. '4 2 On this view, punishment is not so much an act of
reprobation as an act of preemption: it addresses not the accomplished
deed but contemplated misdeeds, not the actual criminal but potential
offenders. Bentham thus insists on the "exemplarity" of punishment, for
"[e]xample is the most important end of all, in proportion as the number
of the persons under temptation to offend is to one." And, as he further
argues, "there is not any means by which a given quantity of punishment
can be rendered more exemplary, than by choosing it of such a sort as
shall bear an analogy to the offence."43 Translating this into the terms of
our discussion, we might say that for advocates of deterrence, the crimi-
nal is punished primarily as a sign-a personified analogy between deed
and consequence-and that this sign is posted for the benefit of others,
held up to serve them due warnings.
As Bentham is the first to recognize, however, exemplary punishment
can lead to excesses, to a profligacy in signification. It is not surprising
that, immediately after his discussion of exemplarity, Bentham should
include a section on "frugality" (on the importance of not "produc[ing]
any such superfluous and needless pain"), followed by another section in
which he gingerly considers "exemplarity and frugality, in what they dif-
fer and agree."" Indeed, for all its talk about the salience of example,
The Principles of Morals and Legislation is deeply committed to frugality
as the law's operative principle. Bentham begins his discussion of penol-
ogy with a chapter on "Cases Unmeet for Punishment," and concludes
with a chapter on "The Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence"-
thus anticipating, by more than a century, Oliver Wendell Holmes's rec-
ommendations in "The Path of the Law."45 In the course of that inter-
vening century, as criminal law became more and more frugal in its
semantics, the luxury of signification became defined more and more as a
41. For general discussions of the traditional rationales for punishment, see Jerome Hall,
General Principles of Criminal Law, 2nd. ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960), 296-324; H. L. A.
Hart, "Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment," in his Punishment and Responsibility (New
York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968), 1-27.
42. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789; reprint,
Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1907), 178.
43. Ibid., 171, 194. Italics in original text.
44. Ibid., 194-95.
45. For the relation between Holmes and Bentham, see H. L. Pohlman, Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes and Utilitarian Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1984).
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feature of the novel, as its generic privilege or attribute.46 Yet such a
transfer of jurisdiction is not absolute. Against the novel's symbolic lati-
tude, so manifestly in evidence, we should remind ourselves of a residual
latitude in the criminal law, a residual capacity for textualization, which
suggests that, even within its austere precincts, a "crime" is never strictly
a given, never wholly external or prior to the verdict by which it is
judged, but rather a textual effect, formed in the very process of
judgment.
This is not simply a fanciful way of putting things. Some material
consequences result from seeing crime as a textual phenomenon, shaped
by the processes through which it is apprehended and represented.
Indeed, if the debate among legal scholars is any indication, the very
authority of criminal law-its claim to neutrality and rationality-rests
on whether "crime" is to be understood as a substantive or interpretive
category, as an autonomous given or a procedural effect. Mark Kelman
has argued, for example, that legal reasoning in criminal law is both pro-
pelled and constrained by its "interpretive constructs." By adopting a
variably broad or narrow time frame with regard to causal antecedents,
and a variably broad or narrow compass with regard to intent, these
"interpretive constructs" in fact prejudge the issue, since the verdict
arrived at is a foregone conclusion given the choice of certain criminal
law categories." Kelman does not use the word "narrative," but he
implies that the criminal law can assign blame only by constructing a
narrative about its putative object, an interpretive construct whose tem-
poral and spatial boundaries determine not just the gravity of the offense
but its very content and character. Given the controlling power of such
interpretive constructs, the attribution of fault would appear to be proce-
durally weighted, procedurally overdetermined, and the entire system of
criminal justice might begin to look like something that is itself crimi-
nally unjust.48
I mention Kelman at some length, partly to indicate the high stakes
46. In his classic study, The American Novel and its Tradition (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday
Anchor Books, 1957), Richard Chase has identified the luxury of signification as the unique feature
of the American novel, for which he reserves the distinguishing label, "romance." Here I use
"novel" as the more encompassing category.
47. Mark Kelman, "Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law," Stanford Law
Review 33 (1981): 591-673. Kelman's essay is part of a larger effort, associated with Critical Legal
Studies, to deconstruct the putative neutrality of legal reasoning. His argument has implications
outside the criminal law as well. See, for example, the responses to him in the "Symposium on
Causation in the Law of Torts," Chicago-Kent Law Review 63 (1987): 397-680.
48. Stanley Fish, for example, has objected to Kelman on the grounds that "what Kelman is
really complaining about is that there is a criminal law at all." But that seems to me to be precisely
Kelman's point. See Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of
Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1989), 392-98. For a more
sustained, if implicit, response to Kelman, see Michael S. Moore, "The Moral and Metaphysical
Sources of the Criminal Law," in Criminal Justice. Nomos XXVII. Yearbook of the American
Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, eds. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New
York: New York Univ. Press, 1985), 11-51.
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involved in speaking of crime as a textual phenomenon, but partly also to
distinguish my approach from his. Kelman is primarily concerned with
the ground of adjudication (or the lack thereof); by focusing on the
"interpretive constructs" of criminal law, he calls into question the foun-
dational neutrality of judicial decisions. My essay builds on his insight
but reverses his direction of inquiry. Conceding at once that judgment is
interpretive, that it is exercised through a process of textualization, I
want to focus, all the same, not so much on its arbitrary ground as on its
abundant figures. What concerns me is the range of symbolic inscrip-
tions brought into play by a particular act of judgment, the wealth of
referents encoded in a seemingly discrete offense. Such a focus might
seem unduly aesthetic, in a context where perhaps ethics alone ought to
matter. Still, by emphasizing the figurative in the assignment of blame-
by studying the punitive, the proscriptive, and the prescriptive as a series
of symbolic relations-I mean to suggest that, in law as in literature, the
ethics of punishment might not be so readily distinguishable from its
aesthetics.
This much said, we can return to Judith, that symbolic criminal, and
to her symbolic crime, the crime of anonymity. If Judith is indeed a
synecdoche, for what family of crimes does she stand? What patterns of
prohibition are adumbrated by her specific instance of punishment, what
cluster of social meanings are encoded, elaborated, rendered intelligible?
As it happens, the "crime of anonymity" is not altogether unique to
Judith. Indeed, E. P. Thompson has discussed an entire category of
offenses under that label, and it is helpful here to recall the sense of his
initial usage. By the "crime of anonymity," Thompson refers to a phe-
nomenon common in eighteenth-century England, the writing and send-
ing of anonymous letters, usually from the lowly to the exalted, letters
variously salacious, rambunctious, or simply extortive. According to
Thompson, such crimes were especially prevalent in a stratified society, a
society of ascriptive estates which, "in myth if not in actuality, rested
upon relations of paternalism and deference." In such a world, where
social distinctions were both customary and compulsory, norms of con-
duct depended entirely on the denomination of identity. Proper names
not only indicated who one was, they also indicated what was proper to
one's social station. Crimes of anonymity were deeply unsettling (and
were treated as a capital offense) for that very reason. As Thompson
says, "anonymity was of the essence of any early form of industrial or
social protest," because (or so it seemed to eighteenth-century English-
men) to refuse denomination was to reject the norms of social estate.49
Judith is neither so political nor so purposeful in her crime of anonym-
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ity. Yet even in her case, names are intimately bound up with social
station and social entitlement. She is glad to be temporarily without a
name-to be "Judith, and Judith only"-because Hutter's name seems
so clearly beneath her. He is a "coarse and illiterate" man; his marriage
to her mother was a "horror," the two being "an ill-assorted pair," she
being in "every way so much his superior."5 ° The name "Hutter" ill
becomes the mother, and, by the same token, it ill becomes the daughter
as well. Judith's problem, a lifelong one apparently, is to find a last name
that would equitably consort with the first, a last name that would finally
give her a denotative parity.
Judith is not altogether without choice in this matter. Indeed, at vari-
ous points, the narrative teases us with the possibility of her finding a
nomenclatural partner, even going so far as to couple her name with
another name, holding up the compound as if to test for fit. The fit is not
always ideal, however, as Judith is the first to notice. "No-no--Judith
without a name would never consent to be called Judith March! Any-
thing would be better than that!" she exclaims at one point. She can
afford to be firm here, because a more suitable name seems to be awaiting
her, and she is not too shy to tell the owner, "the name is a good one;
either Hetty or myself would a thousand times rather be called Hetty
Bumppo or Judith Bumppo than to be called Hetty or Judith Hutter.
' 5
1
Natty is not so sure. He points out, reasonably enough, that the pro-
posed names are "a moral impossible, unless one of you should so far
demean herself as to marry me." And, so as not to be uncivil, he adds,
"There's been handsome women, too, they tell me, among the Bumppos,
afore now, and should you take up with the name, oncommon as you be,
in this particular, them that knows the family won't be altogether sur-
prised." In spite of such encouragement, however, the name "Judith
Bumppo" is actually unthinkable, and for obvious reasons. Natty, how-
ever, offers a kinder and gentler excuse: "Judith, you come of people
altogether above mine in the world, and onequal matches, like onequal
friendships, can't often tarminate kindly."52
Judith and Natty would have been an "ill-assorted pair," not unlike
Judith's mother and Hutter. Since she too is "in every way so much his
superior," the name "Judith Bumppo" would have been doomed, like the
name "Judith Hutter," by a nomenclatural incommensurability. Of
course, Judith is not the one to raise any objections now, but the objec-
tions are raised for her and, we might add, against her. She is too good
for the name Bumppo-this being not so much a compliment as a cri-
tique-and it is incumbent upon her to find a name that she is not "alto-
gether above," but perfectly equal to.
50. Cooper, The Deerslayer, 399.
51. Ibid., 409, 405.
52. Ibid., 405, 411.
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Judith's search for a proper name is not just a search for legitimacy in
marriage-a search conducted under the auspices of sexual propriety-
but also a search for a proper place in the social hierarchy, a search con-
ducted, surprisingly, under the auspices of marital equality. Equality is
the ideal invoked here as the basis for conjugality. Nor is Cooper alone
in this particular, for, as Jan Lewis points out, the ideal of a "symmetri-
cal marriage"-a marriage of equal partners-was widely held in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. An integral part of republican
thought, it was linked to weighty matters of state and pondered by men
of substance.5 3 John Witherspoon, President of Princeton and a frequent
contributor to Ladies Magazine and Pennsylvania Magazine (edited by
Tom Paine), counseled, for example, that "a parity of understanding and
temper [is] as necessary towards forming a good marriage, as an equality
of years, rank, and fortune."54 Numerous other magazine articles agreed
with him. It is not surprising, then, that in The Deerslayer, inequality is
held up as the principal obstacle to a proposed marriage. In fact, on
those grounds Natty is compelled to reject, not one, but two such unac-
ceptable proposals: not just an "onequal match" with Judith, but another
match, also unequal, with Sumac, widow of the recently killed Le Loup
Cervier, who demands marriage even more stridently. But, as Hetty
observes, "Sumac is old and you are young," and, as Natty himself
observes, "she's red and I'm white." Such a flagrant violation of equality
makes death "more nat'ral like, and welcome, than wedlock with this
woman."
55
Equality, invoked as a marital ideal, foregrounds race as one ground of
incommensurability.56 It also foregrounds class. The social rankings of
the marriage partners are very much at issue here, for, paradoxically, it is
only by settling the question of rank--only by fixing upon one particular
class to which both partners belong-that the marriage can be judged
equal. To give the paradox an even sharper edge, we might say that the
ideal of marital equality proceeds from the fact of social hierarchy. It
does not so much eliminate the concept of social station as accentuate it.
Equality is a classifying principle here-it matches like with like-and,
as such, it sets the protocol not only for gender relations, but also for
social distinctions. It is in this context, in the convergence of gender and
class under the norm of equality, that proper names come to occupy such
an important place in the story. Designating not only what is proper to a
sexual persona but also what is proper to a social station, proper names
53. Jan Lewis, "The Republican Wife: Virtue and Seduction in the Early Republic," William
and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 44 (1987): 707-13.
54. John Witherspoon, "On Conjugal Affection," Ladies Magazine (Philadelphia), Sept. 1792,
176. Quoted in Lewis, "Republican Wife," 710 n. 79.
55. Cooper, The Deerslayer, 473.
56. For a discussion of marriage in the context of race, see Philip Fisher, Hard Facts (New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1987), 22-86.
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range across two semantic fields, conflating gender and class, binding
both to a common purpose, mapping the lineaments of one onto the
countenance of the other.
Thus proper names in The Deerslayer are the "leverage-points," where
categories of gender and class exchange burdens of meaning and, in this
case, exchange burdens of guilt. It is not Judith's fault, after all, that she
cannot be Judith Hutter; her lack of a maiden name comes from her
mother's transgressions against class. It is very much Judith's fault,
however, that she cannot be Judith Bumppo; her lack of a married name
comes from her own transgressions against gender. Judith would seem
to be a criminal only in one category; as a symbolic criminal, however,
she is guilty on both counts. Gender here serves as a negative alibi for
class, doing for class what it cannot do for itself. Interestingly-and the
point is worth emphasizing-Judith's crimes against gender and class are
correlated here, not in exact symmetry, but in inverse ratio, making her
"onequal" to Natty in two opposing senses. As a fallen woman, she is
clearly not good enough for him; as the offspring of people "altogether
above [him] in the world," she is clearly too good for him. Sexual propri-
ety and social decorum are inversely symmetrical here, in such a way as
to bring about a curious alignment between being "too good" and being
"not good enough." Both are offenses against equality; together they
carry the double weight of prohibition.
IV. THE PROBLEM OF EQUALITY
For Judith, the insistence on equality has definite punitive conse-
quences, and this punitive usage is not only at work in the name
Bumppo: Judith is deemed unequal to another name as well. Captain
Warley, the owner of that name, suggests as much. She is "a lovely crea-
ture, this Judith Hutter," he confesses, but, as he hastens to add, "I do
suppose there are women in the colonies that a captain of light infantry
need not disdain, but they are not to be found up here on a mountain
lake." The dalliance between Warley and Judith, Cooper tells us, has all
the marks of an "association between superior and inferior." And so it is
that, at the end of the book, there should be "a lady of rare beauty in
[Warley's] lodge ... though she did not bear his name."57
Indeed, "Judith Warley" is an unimaginable name in The Deerslayer.
Unlike the other two names, "Judith March" and "Judith Bumppo,"
names tantalizingly held up for our appraisal, this one is not even
allowed to materialize on the page. The boundaries of class are unques-
tionably prohibitive here-even more so, for Cooper, than the boundaries
of sex. Judith's sexual failing is the most tangible, certainly the most
admissible, cause of her anonymity. And yet, inscribed into this literal
57. Cooper, The Deerslayer, 511, 151, 534.
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offense is a densely packed symbolic universe, a universe of normative
boundaries that she has likewise transgressed, both in her less than name-
able sexual identity and in her less than nameable social identity.
Judith, though, is by no means an uncouth or ill-favored person vainly
aspiring to a social station that is manifestly beyond her. If she is indeed
an "inferior," as we are told, that inferiority is not at all self-evident.
Quite the contrary. Judith is polished, perhaps overly polished, both in
appearance and in demeanor. "Her language [is] superior to that used by
her male companions, her own father included," displaying no "mean
intonation of voice, or a vulgar use of words." Indeed, "the officers of
the nearest garrison [had] often flattered [her] with the belief that few
ladies of the towns acquitted themselves better than herself in this impor-
tant particular.
58
Judith's refined speech is an enviable asset, and Cooper, for one, is not
likely to overlook its social significance. In The American Democrat, he
had suggested that "[a] just, clear and simple expression of our ideas is a
necessary accomplishment for all who aspire to be classed with gentle-
men and ladies."59 By his own criterion, Judith would seem to merit
being "classed with gentlemen and ladies." She is an inferior who
unforgivably commands a superior manner of speech. In being such
"marked exceptions to all the girls of their class," she and Hetty make
themselves utterly unclassifiable.'
Judith's crime, to put it most generally, is a crime against classification
itself.61 She is either above someone or beneath someone, either superior
or inferior, but never achieves the magical state of equality. It is tempt-
ing here to describe her in the vocabulary of Arnold van Gennep and
Victor Turner: she is a "liminal" character, caught "betwixt and between
all the recognized fixed points ... of structural classification," someone
who is "neither one thing nor another," "neither here nor there," "at
once no longer classified and not yet classified."62 The vocabulary of
liminality almost describes Judith, but, in one crucial respect, it does not,
and it is instructive to see why this is so. The liminal person, for van
Gennep and Turner, is not so much a deviant as a truant, a figure caught
in transit, as it were, between normative states, but whose progress is
58. Ibid., 134, 135.
59. James Fenimore Cooper, The American Democrat: Or, Hints on the Social and Civic
Relations of the United States of America (1838; reprint, New York: Knopf, 1931), 110.
60. As Nina Baym says, "the crucial thing about both Hutter girls is their lack of social
position." See her "The Women of Cooper's Leatherstocking Tales," American Quarterly 23 (197 1):
705.
61. For an interesting discussion of class and classification, see Richard Terdiman, "Is There a
Class in this Class?" in The New Historicism, ed. Aram Veeser (New York: Routledge, 1989), 225-
30.
62. Victor Turner, "Betwixt and Between: The Liminal Period in Rites de Passage," first
published in The Proceedings of the American Ethnological Society (1964), reprinted in The Forest of
Symbols (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1967), 96-97. Turner draws on Arnold van Gennep, The Rites
of Passage (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1960).
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such as to ensure an eventual restitution of the boundaries momentarily
ruptured. Judith's truancy has no such terminal limit, and no such teleo-
logical guarantee. She will always remain "betwixt and between," always
"no longer classified and not yet classified."
Judith is not a liminal person. She cannot be, because there is no final
resting place for her, no stable hierarchy into which she might be
inducted, no encompassing "structure that defines status and establishes
social distance."63 To say this is also to say that there is a world of
difference between the society Judith inhabits and the stable tribal society
described by van Gennep and Turner. Indeed, that which van Gennep
and Turner take to be a structural aberration is, in her world, the very
structural norm. Pervading The Deerslayer is an intense anxiety over
uncertain classification: the anxiety of constantly having to establish
one's identity, to rank oneself above someone or beneath someone, to
ascertain who is equal to whom. The verdict of superiority and inferi-
ority afflicts not just Judith, but everyone else as well; and, since the ver-
dict changes from moment to moment, and indeed from judge to judge,
its sentencing power resides not so much in its conclusiveness as in its
ceaseless fluctuation. The problem of equality is a problem for more than
just Judith.
A casual conversation between Hutter and Hetty, for example, illus-
trates just how severe the problem of equality is, and how intimately it
structures every person's sense of self as well as sense of others:
"[Y]ou're by no means ugly, though not as comely as Jude."
"Is Judith any happier for being so handsome?"
"She may be, child, and she may not be. But talk of other mat-
ters, now, for you hardly understand these, poor Hetty. How do
you like our new acquaintance, Deerslayer?"
"He isn't handsome, Father. Hurry is far handsomer than
Deerslayer. '
In the space of this brief exchange, two different sets of people have
been brought forward to be compared, and two different sets of criteria
have been invoked as the basis for comparison. "Not as comely," "hap-
pier," "far handsomer"-these invidious gradations make up the cogni-
tive frames by which one sees oneself as well as everyone else. Hutter
uses beauty, first of all, as the standard of measurement, which puts
Judith considerably ahead of Hetty. Hetty, however, counters with a dif-
ferent standard-happiness-and, on that scale, Judith does not fare
quite so well. Yet when Hetty herself proceeds to compare Hurry Harry
and Natty, she abandons happiness as a criterion and returns to the pre-
63. Turner "Betwixt and Between," 110.
64. Cooper, The Deerslayer, 83.
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vious standard, beauty, in order to pronounce Hurry the better of the
two.
Social relations in The Deerslayer are governed by a ubiquitous
calculus of tangible and intangible merits. The ubiquity of such a
calculus makes ranking not easier but shakier. To return to the vexed
question, for example, about the relative standing of Judith and Natty,
how is one to decide? Natty, of course, has announced that Judith is
"altogether above" him, but things are actually not so clear. Judith her-
self, for instance, far from supposing that she is above him, fancies herself
quite his inferior. "But we are not altogether unequal, sister-Deerslayer
and I?" she asks Hetty. "He is not altogether my superior?" Equality-
between herself and Natty-is a burning question for Judith, and, work-
ing herself into a frenzy, she will go on to ask that question three more
times in the course of the same conversation. "Why do you think me the
equal of Deerslayer?" she asks Hetty again. And then again, "Tell me
what raises me to an equality with Deerslayer." And finally, not satisfied
with Hetty's answer, she asks yet again, "But I fear you flatter me, Hetty,
when you think I can be justly called the equal of a man like Deerslayer.
It is true, I have been better taught; in one sense more comely; and per-
haps might look higher; but then his truth-his truth-makes a fearful
difference between us."
65
Judith is comically obsessed here, but, in a way, she is simply doing to
herself (and to Natty) what everybody else has been doing throughout
the book. She is defining herself through terms of comparison-"better
taught," "more comely," "look higher." What is striking here, however,
is the utter arbitrariness of the scale on which comparisons are made. On
Judith's scale, for example, literacy and good looks carry some weight,
but "truth" carries infinitely more, so much more that it tips the balance
altogether. On Hetty's scale, however, a very different picture emerges.
Hetty is flabbergasted, in fact, that Judith would even entertain the
thought of not being equal to Natty. "To think of you asking me this,
Judith!" she exclaims with great indignation:
"Superior, Judith!" she repeated with pride. "In what can Deer-
slayer be your superior? Are you not Mother's child-and does he
know how to read-and wasn't Mother before any woman in all this
part of the world? I should think, so far from supposing himself
your superior, he would hardly believe himself mine. You are hand-
some, and he is ugly-"
"No, not ugly, Hetty," interrupted Judith. "Only plain. But his
honest face has a look in it that is far better than beauty. In my eyes
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"Judith Hutter, you frighten me! Hurry is the handsomest mortal
in the world---even handsomer than you are yourself.",
66
Who is equal to whom? The question obsesses everyone, but Natty,
Judith, and Hetty all have different answers. With breakneck speed, the
terms for comparison shift and the partners for comparison multiply. It
is not just Judith and Deerslayer who are being compared now, but also
Hurry and Deerslayer, and then Judith and Hurry. One thing is clear,
though, in this pandemonium: there will always be a riot of opinions
here, strong opinions, conflicting opinions, and nothing more than opin-
ions. Using the same taxonomic terms but arriving at sharply different
conclusions, Judith and Hetty only bewilder one another. Both in their
obsession with ranking and in their inability to agree about the ranking,
they point to a larger cultural moment-something like a crisis of equal-
ity-in which personal identities, normative standards, and social dis-
tinctions are all endlessly negotiable, endlessly in flux. What is liminal
here is not so much particular individuals as the entire social structure.67
V. CLASSICAL REPUBLICANISM AND MODERN LIBERALISM
The "liminality" of nineteenth-century America is a commonplace
among historians. 68 Here I want to associate it, more specifically, with a
moment of transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, from
the world of republican polity to the world of liberal individualism. Such
a transition singled out and conferred upon the idea of equality a new
and strongly individualistic aspect and, in detaching it from the fabric of
republican thought, strained the concept almost to its breaking point.
Gordon Wood has described this transition, in a celebrated phrase, as
"the end of classical politics." "The eighteenth century had sought to
understand politics," Wood writes, by appealing to "a graduated organic
chain in the social hierarchy. ' 69 Eighteenth-century classical republican-
ism celebrated social differences, and celebrated them not as the distin-
guishing mark among individuals, but as the operative condition for a
civic order; for, as J. G. A. Pocock points out, a healthy polity could
come about only with organic gradations, only with a "naturally differen-
66. Ibid., 301. Emphasis in original text.
67. Turner himself has suggested that, in contrast to the localized and terminal liminality of
tribal society, liminality in modem societies might be universal and permanent: "What appears to
have happened is that with the increasing specialization of society and culture, with progressive
complexity in the social division of labor, what was in tribal society principally a set of transitional
qualities ... has become itself an institutionalized state." See The Ritual Process: Structure and Anti-
Structure (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1969), 107.
68. Karen Halttunen uses the word "liminality" specifically and extensively. See her Confidence
Men and Painted Women: A Study of Middle-Class Culture of America, 1830-1870 (New Haven:
Yale Univ. Press, 1982), 1-32. See also Jean-Christophe Agnew, Worlds Apart: The Market and the
Theater in Anglo-American Thought, 1550-1750 (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1986), 195-203.
69. Gordon Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of
North Carolina Press, 1969), 606-07.
[Vol. 4: 209
24
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1992], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol4/iss2/2
Dimock
tiated people," "performing complementary roles and practicing comple-
mentary virtues."
70
Classification was not a problem in classical politics because, rather
than sowing the seeds of contention, it furnished the structural grounds
for a civic order. In this world of organic distinctions, equality was, par-
adoxically, not a problem either. Indeed, as Pocock also points out,
equality had an important place in classical republicanism, being con-
ceived as "an equal subjection to the respublica." There was no contra-
diction between the idea of equality and an operating polity of formal
differentiation, for, even "though by any standard but one the shares
accorded each were commensurate but unequal, there was a criterion of
equality (in ruling and being ruled) whereby each remained the other's
equal."'7' To simplify Pocock's complicated argument (and bedeviling
prose), we might say that, in classical republicanism, differentiation was
understood as a participatory category rather than as a distributive cate-
gory, as a function of the polity rather than as a function of individual
benefit. So, far from being an affront to equality, differentiation was
actually the precondition for it.
What Wood calls the "end of classical politics" registers the break-
down of this comfortable symbiosis. J. R. Pole sums this up with admi-
rable cogency: "[t]he American Revolution introduced an egalitarian
rhetoric to an unequal society." '72 The seamless relation between equality
and differentiation, once taken for granted, now became the fault line
along which the entire republican polity threatened to come apart. The
egalitarian rhetoric which had united the "oppressed" colonies against
the "tyranny" of their British rulers now turned back upon itself and,
redirecting its scrutiny to the domestic front, it quickly discovered,
within the new nation itself, the same drama of hierarchy and oppres-
sion. Civil society was now envisioned not as a harmonious order dedi-
cated to a common good, but as a factious aggregate plagued by incipient
tyrannies. To be "different" was now a dubious benefit, and James
Madison, in his famous entry to The Federalist, gave the word a notice-
ably diabolical cast, linking it to conflicting "interests" on the one hand
and to unavoidable "inequality" on the other. "From the protection of
different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of
different degrees and kinds of property immediately results," Madison
wrote. "A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile inter-
est, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity
70. J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic
Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975), 516.
71. Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 469; J. G. A. Pocock, "Virtues, Rights, and Manners: A
Model for Historians of Political Thought," Political Theory 9 (1981): 353-68; reprinted in his
Virtue, Commerce, and History (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1985), 42-43.
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in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by
different sentiments and views," in such a way that "the most frivolous
and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly
passions and excite their most violent conflicts."73 Alexander Hamilton,
meanwhile, worried about the "differences that neighborhood occa-
sions," and warned of "ruinous contentions" resulting from "impulses of
rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and other irregular and violent
propensities."74
Hamilton was writing in the aftermath of the 1786 Shays's Rebellion,
which he identified by name.75 That rebellion seemed to epitomize the
natural tendency of democracies towards "ruinous contentions," for its
participants, to the horror of all, were revealed not to be dyed-in-the-
wool ruffians, but ordinary farmers in distress, led by none other than a
former militia captain. The rebels were put down, but, again to the hor-
ror of all, they were able to recoup, in a matter of months, under a new
tactic, namely, by "promot[ing] their views under the auspices of consti-
tutional forms," as Madison bitterly observed.7 6 Those constitutional
forms proved so hospitable that they were soon in a position "to establish
iniquity by Law."' 77 The public dismay occasioned by the rebellion illus-
trated the extent to which a "naturally differentiated people" was now
seen not as a pillar of the republic, but as a keg of dynamite beneath it.
78
It also illustrated the extent to which the idea of equality had been trans-
formed from a classical to a liberal concept: from a participatory cate-
gory to a distributive category, from a structural feature of the civic
polity to a local feature of individual benefit, a feature which led inevita-
bly to "different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views."
The exact nature of the political changes in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries is of course a much disputed issue. Inspired by
the work of Bernard Bailyn, J. G. A. Pocock, and Gordon Wood, histori-
ans have engaged in a long and heated debate over the relative centrality
of classical republicanism and Lockean liberalism in the early republic.79
73. James Madison, The Federalist Papers, ed. Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American
Library, 1961), no. 10.
74. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, no. 6.
75. Ibid.
76. Madison to Jefferson, April 23, 1787. Quoted in Wood, The Creation of the American
Republic, 413.
77. Theodore Sedgwick to Governor Bowdoin, April 8, 1787. Quoted in Wood, The Creation of
the American Republic, 467.
78. Some historians take Shays's Rebellion to be the cause (or at least the pretext) of the 1787
Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia. For more qualified views, see Robert A. Feer, "Shays's
Rebellion and the Constitution: A Study in Causation," New England Quarterly 42 (1969): 388-410;
Gordon Wood, "Interests and Disinterestedness in the Making of the Constitution," in Beyond
Confederation: Origins ofthe Constitution and American National Identity, ed. Richard Beeman et al.
(Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1987), 69-109.
79. Aside from already-cited works by Wood and Pocock, see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological
Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1967), and The Origins of
American Politics (New York: Knopf, 1968). Bailyn, Wood, and Pocock all argue, implicitly or
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Without being unduly partisan, it is possible to argue for a new orienta-
tion beginning in the 1780s, moving away from the "republican" view of
the polity as differentiation for the common good towards a modem "lib-
eral" view, with its emphasis on differentiation as an individuating prin-
ciple, a principle of centrifugal desires. Liberalism, John Rawls writes,
affirms a "plurality of distinct persons with separate systems of ends."8°
This plurality makes liberalism compelling and problematic in the twen-
tieth century, as it was compelling and problematic in the nineteenth.
"A naturally differentiated people" has a very different connotation in a
liberal universe than it did in the republican. And so too does the con-
cept of equality. As a distributive category-distributing unequal bene-
fits through equal opportunity-the liberal idea of equality embodied at
its very core a self-perpetuating discrepancy, thrown into ever sharper
relief by a growing plurality of claims. 1 Far from being a presumptive
corollary to differentiation, equality has become a logical casualty.
Modem liberalism was, to be sure, neither full-blown nor even fully
articulated at the end of the eighteenth century. Yet, in 1794, the prob-
lem of equality-and the contradiction between equality and differentia-
tion-had become so acute that Samuel Williams, historian of Vermont,
was moved to offer the following attempt at reconciliation:
[Americans] all feel that nature has made them equal in respect to
their rights; or rather that nature has given to them a common and
an equal right to liberty, to property, and to safety; to justice, gov-
ernment, laws, religion, and freedom. They all see that nature has
made them very unequal in respect to their original powers, capaci-
ties, and talents. They become united in claiming and in preserving
the equality, which nature has assigned to them; and in availing
themselves of the benefits, which are designed, and may be derived
from the inequality, which nature has also established. 2
explicitly, against the "liberal tradition" posited by Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1955). For summaries of the debate, see Robert
Shalhope, "Toward a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism
in Early American Historiography," William and Mary Quarterly 29 (1972): 49-80; Dorothy Ross,
"The Liberal Tradition Revisited and the Republican Tradition Addressed," in New Directions in
American Intellectual History, eds. John Highamn and Paul K. Conkin (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Univ. Press, 1979), 116-31; Isaac Kramnick, "Republican Revisionism Revisited," American
Historical Review 87 (1982): 629-64; Lance Banning, "Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and
Classical Ideas in the American Republic," William and Mary Quarterly 43 (1986): 3-19; Joyce
Appleby, "Republicanism in Old and New Contexts," William and Mary Quarterly 43 (1986): 20-
34. Appleby and Kramnick, I should point out, continue to argue for the centrality of liberalism in
American political thought. For a debate about the contemporary usefulness of classical
republicanism, see "Symposium: The Republican Civic Tradition," Yale Law Journal 97 (1988):
1493-1723.
80. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 29.
81. See, for example, Bernard Williams, "The Idea of Equality," in Problems of the Self
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1973), 230-49.
82. Samuel Williams, The Natural and Civil History of Vermont (Walpole, N.H., 1794), 330.
Quoted in Wood, Creation, 607.
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Nature, that time-honored oracle, seemed more than a little confused
here, wavering as it did between an egalitarian theory of rights and a
hierarchic theory of talents. No wonder the author, Samuel Williams,
wrote with some confusion himself. Paying his respects, on the one
hand, to the newly sanctified tenets of individual equality, Williams had
one foot firmly planted in the liberal landscape. Convinced, on the other
hand, that "benefits" were to be "derived from inequality," he was look-
ing backward to a republican universe, "a graduated organic chain in the
social hierarchy." Judging from this spectacle of divided allegiance, we
can only agree with Lance Banning that, "[liogically, it may be inconsis-
tent to be simultaneously liberal and classical. Historically, it was
not."" a Even this formulation does not quite settle the problem, how-
ever, for to be "simultaneously liberal and classical" must entail a pecu-
liar set of dynamics and a peculiar set of tensions. It must give rise, that
is, to a uniquely unstable notion of equality, at best invigorating, at worst
untenable.
Cooper had no pronouncements as delicately balanced or as visibly
perplexed as Williams's. Still, equality was important enough to merit
two chapters in The American Democrat, a work haunted no less than
Williams's by the exigencies of being simultaneously liberal and classical.
In keeping with classical ideals, Cooper observed, quite bluntly, "[tihe
celebrated proposition contained in the declaration of independence is
not to be understood literally. All men are not 'created equal,' in a phys-
ical, or even in a moral sense." And he went on (in language worthy of
The Deerslayer) to enumerate those items that made for organic distinc-
tions: "one has a good constitution, another a bad; one is handsome,
another ugly; one white, another black ... one possessing genius, or a
natural aptitude, while his brother is an idiot."84
Cooper's world remained the world of a naturally differentiated peo-
ple, a graduated organic chain in the social hierarchy. If this sounds
quintessentially classical, it is important to note that this was classical
thought geared to a liberal problematic. Indeed, his pronouncements on
organic differences notwithstanding, Cooper emerged ultimately as an
advocate of equality-equality defined, however, not as a natural fact
pertaining to the individual, but as an artificial arrangement pertaining to
the polity. Equality, he argued, is simply the consequence of "a new
governing principle for the social compact," so that "as regards all
human institutions men are born equal." He was also careful to add,
however, that "human institutions are a human invention, with which
83. Lance Banning, "Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited," 12. In this context, we must also
entertain the possibility that liberalism and republicanism had always comprised a hybrid formation.
See, for example, Thomas L. Pangle's discussion of Montesquieu's "liberal republicanism" in
Montesquieu's Philosophy of Liberalism (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1973).
84. Cooper, The American Democrat, 41.
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nature has had no connection." 5 In fact, for him, the natural inequali-
ties of individuals did not so much challenge as justify the political insti-
tution of equality, since the need for the latter became all the more
evident in light of the former. Cooper's liberalism (like Madison's) was
thus liberalism with a republican heart: a liberalism that, beginning with
equality as an individuating principle, nonetheless ended up repositing its
hopes in the structural efficacies of a political order. Here, then, was an
alternative way to be simultaneously liberal and classical, although,
much like Samuel Williams's pious invocation of nature, Cooper's rudely
denaturalized polity also ushered in a set of problems. After all, if equal-
ity is an artificial institution, not grounded in nature, but contracted by
man, what is there to give it a foundation, a sanctifying ground beyond
its stipulated provisions? And, if equality is "not to be understood liter-
ally," but to be taken rather as a consensual metaphor-a relation of
identity maintained by a "social compact," an agreed upon signifying
process-what is there to make that consensus absolute? 6 What is there
to stop one particular individual from doing some signifying on her own?
What is there to stop someone like Judith, for example, from claiming
that she is metaphorically equal to Natty Bumppo and therefore mar-
riageable to him?
VI. THE FEMINIZATION OF VIRTUE
On this point, however, The Deerslayer stands equipped with an
answer. It is crucial then--crucial not just for the plot, but for a general
problematics of equality-that Judith should be, as the Preface says,
"erring, and fallen." Where all else fails, the category of the fallen
woman remains infallible. The strength of that category restores to the
novel a signifying foundation-a consensual ground that is not provi-
sional but absolute, not artificial but natural-and makes it possible to
say, with recomposed certitude, who is marriageable to whom and who is
equal to whom. To say this is also to suggest that, in The Deerslayer as
in mid-nineteenth-century America, gender is a field of symbolic order: a
field where meanings are affixed, identities clarified, distinctions sus-
tained. Female sexuality is not just a sign; it is a sign whose referent has
become so integral and self-evident that it commands the stability almost
of a natural fact. The distinction between a virtuous maid and a fallen
woman is absolute, and absolutely guaranteed, biology adduced here as
an epistemological ballast.
The great symbolic value of the field of gender, then, stems from its
capacity for naturalizing signs, and hence its compensatory relation to
85. Ibid.
86. For the centrality of consensus to American culture, see Sacvan Bercovitch, The American
Jeremiad (Madison, Wis.: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1978), and The Office of "The Scarlet Letter"
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1991).
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other fields, notably the field of class, where signs are becoming newly
unstable, newly denaturalized."7 Within the conjunction of classical
republicanism and modem liberalism, gender does its symbolic work pri-
marily by restoring a natural order to a newly denaturalized political
order. Against the shakiness of political institutions, gender works with
the solidity of a natural fact. One knows exactly what it takes to be a
fallen woman, what it means to be a fallen woman, and what will eventu-
ally happen to a fallen woman. Thus it is not surprising that in The
Deerslayer, it is within this stable semantic field that the idea of equality
is displayed, incorporated, and given its fullest expression. It does not
matter that Judith and Natty are actually found to be unequal; this
regrettable fact is acknowledged, even proclaimed, since its very regret-
tableness is a tribute to the idea of equality, all the more honored for
being unattained. Just as equality is affirmed here in its absence, what is
affirmed in absence as well is an organic universe, in which human insti-
tutions and human nature exist in an integral unity rather than in a dis-
junction between sign and referent. Such a universe no longer existed in
the mid-nineteenth century, and no doubt never truly existed in that
dreamed-of perfection; but, through the agency of gender, it can at least
be intimated, legitimated, symbolically restored.88 In this context, Ray-
mond Williams's idea of the "dominant, residual, and emergent" must be
broadened to include gender as a primary site of residual formation. 89 In
The Deerslayer, what is residually invoked is the idealized world of class-
ical republicanism, as yet untouched by its accommodating encounters
with modem liberalism, and as yet pristine in its natural harmony: a
world once political in focus, but now shadowed forth only through the
relations between the sexes.
If sexual purity is ritually invoked, as Mary Douglas argues, to repair
the perceived damage to the body politic, the figure of the fallen woman
has a high degree of symbolic universality, indigenous to any society at
war against itself.9" Still, at the particular historical juncture I am inves-
tigating-the transition from classical republicanism to modem liber-
alism-the figure of the woman, fallible whether in potential or in fact,
occupied a special place in her culture's symbolic landscape. Historians
of the early republic have written primarily on the experiential status of
women.9' To their work we might want to add a symbolic supplement, a
87. Indeed, as Michael McKeon points out, the emergence of the very category of "class"
already signaled a destabilized traditional order. See his The Origins of the English Novel, 1600-1740
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1987), 162-67, 255-65.
88. Christine Stansell has arrived at a similar conclusion in her study of working-class women.
See her City of Women: Sex and Class in New York 1789-1869 (New York: Knopf, 1986), 19-37.
89. Raymond Williams, Marxism and Form (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1977), 121-27. For a
more extended discussion of gender as the site of residual formation, see my "Feminism, New
Historicism, and the Reader," American Literature 63 (Winter 1991): 601-22.
90. Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1970), 137-95.
91. See especially Linda K. Kerber, Women of the Republic: Intellect and Ideology in
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focus on the ways by which the figure of woman, her integrity or lack of
integrity, is made to answer to (and perhaps to answer for) the integrity
or lack of integrity of the body politic.
This political symbolism is not altogether fortuitous. Classical republi-
can thought has never been gender-neutral-although, traditionally it
was gendered in a way almost directly contrary to its later avatar. Vir-
tue, that cornerstone of the republican polity, had for centuries been fig-
ured as masculine, manifesting itself in military heroism and civic
activism. The word virtue "derives from the Latin virtus," Hanna Pitkin
points out, "and thus from vir, which means 'man.' Virtd is thus manli-
ness." Meanwhile, fortuna, which puts virt at such hazards, is figured
primarily (though not exclusively) as feminine. "Fortune is a woman,"
Machiavelli memorably observes, and, as Pitkin adds, "while he some-
times calls fortune a goddess, the means of coping with her that he sug-
gests are not those usually applied to divinities."92 The figure of woman
has other meanings as well. In De l'esprit des Lois, Montesquieu associ-
ates her with "luxury," a disease fatal to the republic. He cautions "good
legislators" against the "public incontinence" that "causes women to cor-
rupt even before being corrupted."93
Judith, whose love of luxury is copiously documented, is conceived
very much in the spirit of Montesquieu. Still, love of luxury alone is not
the cause of her indictment. Her capital offense lies elsewhere. Virtue-
and Judith's much decried loss of it-puts her completely beyond the
pale of Natty Bumppo and disqualifies her forever as a claimant of
names. Simply to state that is also to note the enormous distance the
word has traveled, not only from its classical Renaissance roots, but also
from its more immediate precursor in Revolutionary America. To the
Founding Fathers of the republic, virtue was still masculine, still polit-
ical; and if there was some doubt about its availability, there was no
doubt at all about its gender.9" As the foundational attribute of the
republic, the word had a magical charm, as we can see in the ritual invo-
Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1980), and Mary Beth Norton,
Liberty's Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience of American Women, 1750-1800 (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1980).
92. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, Fortune is a Woman: Gender and Politics in the Thought of Niccolo
Machiavelli (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1984), 25, 144.
93. Baron de Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. Anne Cohler, Basia Miller, & Harold
Stone (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1989), 104.
94. Gordon Wood and J. G. A. Pocock have done much to elevate "virtue" into the key term of
Revolutionary thinking. See Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 65-70; Pocock,
Machiavellian Moment, 462-552. Numerous other accounts have followed. See especially John T.
Agresto, "Liberty, Virtue, and Republicanism, 1776-1787," Review of Politics 39 (1977): 473-504;
John P. Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Foundations of
Liberalism (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984); James T. Kloppenberg, "The Virtues of
Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse,"
Journal ofAmerican History 74 (1987): 9-33; Lance Banning, "Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and
the Course of Revolutionary Thinking," in Conceptual Change and the Constitution, eds. Terence
Ball and J. G. A. Pocock (Lawrence, Kansas: Univ. of Kansas Press, 1988), 194-212.
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cations by even a skeptic like James Madison: "I go on this great republi-
can principle: that the people will have virtue and intelligence to select
men of virtue and wisdom." 95 Against that great republican principle,
the prurient focus in The Deerslayer must seem like a cruel joke. From
being a civic ideal, conducive to the public good, virtue has come to
denote a sexual standard, conducive to the acceptability of a marriage.
And, from being embodied by the manly citizen, virtue is now perilously
lodged within the feminine subject.
The feminization of virtue might turn out to be the most important
semantic transformation attendant upon the rise of a liberal political cul-
ture. Ian Watt has long ago alerted us to this "tremendous narrowing of
the ethical scale, a redefinition of virtue in primarily sexual terms." 96
More recently, Ruth Bloch has related this semantic transformation to
structural changes newly effected in the liberal polity, with its emerging
party system, its conception of politics as a sphere of expediency, and,
complementing that development, its emphasis on private morality and
its relegation of the ethical domain to female tutelage.97 In short, the
feminization of virtue registered, in the broadest sense, a cognitive
revolution, a revolution in the way conceptual categories were organized
and differentiated. It had everything to do with the liberal philosophy of
separate spheres, a philosophy which distinguished between the sexes
even as it distinguished among the moral, the economic, and the polit-
ical, organizing each into a discrete domain, setting apart a realm of spir-
itual uplift, a realm of competitive self-interests, and a realm of partisan
alliances.98
Generalizing further, nineteenth-century liberalism not only believed
in separate spheres of life; it also attributed to each of those spheres a
high degree of autonomy, which is to say, a high degree of internal reso-
lution and internal equilibrium, making each self-sufficient on its own
terms, each propelled by its own systemic integrity. The Invisible Hand
behind the self-regulating market is only the most dramatic example of
such internal equilibrium. There are other examples as well. The moral
domain, I argue, also came into its own under the aegis of modem liber-
95. The Debates in the Several State Conventions, ed. Jonathan Elliot, 5 vols. (Washington, D.C.,
1854), III: 536-37. Quoted in Banning, "Second Thoughts on Virtue," 194.
96. Ian Watt, The Rise of the Novel (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1957), 157.
97. Ruth Bloch, "The Gendered Meanings of Virtue in Revolutionary America," Signs 13
(1987): 37-58. This is also Ann Douglas's general point in The Feminization of American Culture
(New York: Knopf, 1977). But see also Jan Lewis, who argues that the emphasis on chastity was
already pervasive in classical republicanism ("Republican Wife," 716-21), and Nancy Cott, who sees
chastity as an ideal consciously advocated by women as a means of empowerment. See her
"Passionlessness: An Interpretation of Victorian Sexual Ideology, 1790-1850," Signs 4 (1978): 219-
36.
98. For the emergence of political parties and partisan politics as a feature of political life, see
Lee Benson, The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961); Joel
Silbey, The Partisan Imperative: The Dynamics ofAmerican Politics Before the Civil War (New York:
Oxford Univ. Press, 1985).
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alism, and did so primarily through a declaration of independence-
through a cognitive separation from the polity and the economy, as well
as from the path of the law-becoming, in the process, a fully autono-
mous domain, discretely conceptualized and reflexively consolidated. So
here, too, a systemic integrity governs the structure of the moral agent,
matching deed and consequence, character and desert, making the field
internally referential and internally accountable.99
VII. RETRIBUTION AND DISTRIBUTION
Natty Bumppo, Cooper's prime exhibit in the way of the moral agent,
offers a good illustration of its workings. As John P. McWilliams has
persuasively argued, and as we see most vividly in The Pioneers, Natty
embodies the moral law, as opposed to the civil law embodied by the
lesser characters."o The moral law, in The Deerslayer, is summed up by
one word, "honesty," an epithet Natty virtually personifies. "I'll answer
for his honesty, whatever I may do for his valor in battle"-this is Harry
March's backhanded compliment, and for the rest of the book, we are
never allowed to lose sight of Natty's "honest face and honest heart."
"All proclaim your honesty," Judith tells him, "your honest countenance
would be sufficient surety for the truth of a thousand hearts." She adds,
"The girl that finally wins you, Deerslayer, will at least win an honest
heart--one without treachery or guile."' '
Honesty, understood as an antidote to "treachery or guile," harkens
back to the eighteenth century, to what Gordon Wood has called its
''paranoid style," a mode of thinking preoccupied with intrigue and
deceit, plots and cabals. Cooper's The Pathfinder (published in 1840,
just one year before The Deerslayer) was an extravagant exercise in just
that genre.' 0 2 However, as Wood also argues, the paranoid style must be
seen not as a collective delusion or illusion, but as a "mode of causal
attribution" which, in supposing that "every social effect, every political
event, had to have a purposive human agent as a cause," implicitly
emphasizes "persons rather than processes," and "presumes a world of
autonomous, freely acting individuals who are capable of directly and
deliberately bringing about events through their decisions and actions,
and who thereby can be held morally responsible for what happens."
The paranoid style, then, turns out to be a theory of moral accountabil-
99. Elsewhere I have discussed this as a model of "personified accounting." See my Empire for
Liberty: Melville and the Poetics of Individualism (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1989), 176-214.
100. John P. McWilliams, Political Justice in a Republic: James Fenimore Cooper's America
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1972), 237-97. In The Pioneers Natty is put on trial for
violating the civil law.
101. Cooper, The Deerslayer, 63, 74, 128, 126, 130.
102. Prominently featured in The Pathfinder is Lieutenant Muir, the Quartermaster, whose
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ity. Assuming as it does an exact symmetry between cause and effect,
between motive and consequence, it sustains not just a style of political
discourse but also a style of moral reasoning. And, as Wood also points
out, this mode of causal attribution has not died with the eighteenth cen-
tury: "its assumptions still permeate our culture, although, as our system
of criminal punishment shows, in increasingly archaic and contradictory
ways."
10 3
Natty is not about to become a recipient of such criminal punishment.
Still, his much touted honesty must be seen against a universe of moral
causation, in which the attribution of character is potentially also the
attribution of blame. Natty, of course, is attributed with a good charac-
ter, one that has incorporated the symmetry of cause and effect into its
very structure of being. As Judith says, "Your honest face and honest
heart tell us that what you promise you will perform."'" Face and
heart, promise and performance-these terms are causally linked, and
linked in such a way as to ensure a commendable symmetry. Natty's
moral character rests on this, and it is not surprising that the litmus test
for him should be the act of promise-keeping, an act which, if performed,
establishes just such a symmetry between originating deed and conse-
quent end. Promise-keeping is central to Cooper (as it was more gener-
ally to nineteenth-century thought) as the criterion for a morality
grounded within the person, 10 5 and here Natty's conduct is exemplary.
Captured by the Hurons, he is allowed to leave on a "furlough." Judith
thinks it is "extraordinary self-destruction and recklessness" to return
voluntarily, but Natty disagrees. For him, a furlough is a "thong that
binds tighter than any chain.... Ropes and chains allow of knives, and
desait, and contrivances, but a furlough can be neither cut, slipped, nor
sarcumvented."1
06
Bound reflexively to himself-word to deed and face to heart-Natty
achieves a perfectly integrated selfhood, a selfhood that is itself a causal
sequence or, to be more precise, a causal circle, ending where it begins,
the terminal effect being fully encompassed by the original intention. He
is as good as his word. Here, then, is a principle of equality that will
actually hold fast. Ever problematic as a distributive principle, ever
endangered by competing claims, equality works best as a reflexive prin-
ciple, underwriting the integrity of the moral agent, matching motive and
consequence, and so arriving at a state of equilibrium where causal attri-
103. Gordon Wood, "Conspiracy and the Paranoid Style: Causality and Deceit in the
Eighteenth Century," William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 39 (1982): 409, 430, 411, 409.
104. Cooper, The Deerslayer, 74.
105. For a history of the changing status of promises (especially in relation to contractual
obligations), see P. S. Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press, 1979), 139-218, 652-59. For a contemporary statement, see Charles Fried, Contract as
Promise: A Theory of Contractual Obligation (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1981).
106. Cooper, The Deerslayer, 370, 445.
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bution can be translated into moral judgment. On the strength of that
equilibrium, Natty is able to go through a succession of names-
"Straight-tongue," "Pigeon," "Lap-Ear," "Deerslayer," "Hawkeye"-
without failing always to be equal to himself. Also on the strength of
that equilibrium, the novel ends, having rejected various unequal
matches, with that curious, seemingly tautological, but by no means
unexpected union: between a man named Deerslayer and a gun named
Killdeer.
Equality-internalized as a principle of systemic integrity, as a relation
within oneself and between oneself-governs not only the morality of
Natty's reward, but also the morality of Judith's punishment. Judith, as
we know, is someone on whom equality does not sit comfortably, since
she is always above or beneath someone else. Such a difficulty, however,
is not without its remedy. The remedy is suggested, in fact, by Hurry
Harry, in an oddly prescient remark to Thomas Hutter. Judith, he says,
"hasn't her equal on the frontiers for good looks, whatever she may have
for good behavior.... Give me Jude, if her conduct was only equal to her
looks!' °7 Hurry begins by stating the problem-Judith, once again, has
failed to be equal to anyone-but he quickly moves from the problematic
to the optative, turning from the unequal distribution of beauty among
persons to a more congenial topic, namely, the maintenance of equality
between "looks" and "conduct" within a single person. As with Natty,
equality is relocated here within the structure of the self-relocated, in
fact, through an initial fracturing of the self: a worrisome division
between "looks" and "conduct." This division, however, puts the self at
the center of a moral universe, for only within a divided self can a princi-
ple of reflexivity be maintained. Charles Taylor has linked this "radical
reflexivity" to "self-objectification" in Lockean liberalism.' °8 Here, I
want to relate it to a different set of liberal problematics, more specifi-
cally, to the problematics of equality. The reflexive, I argue, transposes,
redresses, and recasts as a disciplinary proposition what is problemati-
cally unstable as a distributive proposition. In this view, the structure of
the moral agent would seem to be constituted out of a relocated axis of
equality, now placed within a single individual rather than between indi-
viduals, and so turning a distributive relation into a retributive relation.
Judith is equal to herself in just this retributive sense, her desert match-
ing her character, Judith-without-a-name always remaining Judith-with-
out-a-name.
The intimate link between retribution and distribution suggests that
penal philosophy and political theory might have more in common than
107. Ibid., 73.
108. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self.- The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1989), 159-76.
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we ordinarily suppose.' °9 In Cooper, those connections are certainly
striking, although, we should also add, not entirely unprecedented.
Indeed, the peregrination of "equality"-its movement from between
persons to within a single person-had shown up even more dramatically
in Kant, in that critical moment in The Philosophy of Law, when, arguing
for the death penalty, he justifies it by invoking the "Equalization of Pun-
ishment with Crime":
What is the mode and measure of Punishment which Public Justice
takes as its Principle and Standard? It is just the Principle of Equal-
ity, by which the pointer of the Scale of Justice is made to incline no
more to the one side than the other .... There is no Likeness or
proportion between Life, however painful, and Death; and therefore
there is no Equality between the crime of Murder and the retaliation
of it but what is judicially accomplished by the execution of the
Criminal .... This ought to be done in order that every one may
realize the desert of his deeds, and that bloodguiltiness may not
remain upon the people.... The Equalization of Punishment with
Crime, is therefore only possible by the cognition of the Judge
extending even to the penalty of Death, according to the Right of
Retaliation .... It is only thus that a Sentence can be pronounced
over all criminals proportionate to their internal wickedness."10
Kant begins, uneventfully enough, with the familiar notion of equality
under the law, placing equality distributively among juridical subjects.
This initial placement, however, is not meant to be permanent. Almost
immediately, equality begins its journey inward, taking up residence
within a single individual: as a relation between "deed" and "desert,"
between crime and punishment. Once again, distribution modulates into
retribution and, in this case, it is retribution with a vengeance, complete
with pronouncements on "internal wickedness," even "bloodguiltiness."
Kant was moved to such vehemence in part by the phenomenal suc-
cess of Cesare Beccaria, whose treatise on penal reform, Dei delitti e delle
pene, first published in Tuscany in 1764, was translated into French in
1766-translated by Morellet, annotated by Diderot, and prefaced by
Voltaire. Beccaria was hailed as the "Socrates of our epoch,""' winning
the rapt attention not only of the Paris intelligentsia, but also of a
109. Unfortunately, as J. Roland Pennock points out, "[b]ooks on 'justice' usually have
relatively little to say about 'criminal justice.' " See his introduction to Criminal Justice, 1.
110. Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law, trans. W. Hastie (1887; reprint, Clifton, N.J.: A.
M. Kelley, 1974), 196-98. This is the Edinburgh edition of Kant's Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der
Rechslehre (1796). Italics in original text. The Hastie translation is more complete than the 1965
Ladd translation, under the title of The Metaphysical Elements of Justice. While Kant is best known
for his extreme view here, his pronouncements elsewhere are actually more complex. See, for
example, Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Does Kant have a Theory of Punishment?" Columbia Law Review 87
(1987): 509-58; B. Sharon Byrd, "Kant's Theory of Punishment," Law and Philosophy 8 (1989): 151-
200.
111. Peter Gay, The Enlightenment: The Science of Freedom (New York: Norton, 1977), 438.
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number of monarchs, including Frederick II of Prussia, Maria Teresa of
Austria, Grand Duke Leopold of Tuscany, and Catherine the Great of
Russia, who called upon the author to reside at her court and supervise
the necessary reforms in person. In less exalted circles, Blackstone was
similarly impressed and featured Beccaria prominently in his Commenta-
ries on the Laws of England. Bentham (who detested Blackstone) like-
wise acknowledged his debt to Beccaria by name. Meanwhile, in the
American colonies, John Adams, as a young lawyer in 1770, saw fit to
invoke "the words of the marquis Beccaria" to defend the British soldiers
implicated in the Boston Massacre-to such effect that none of them was
found guilty of murder. Jefferson, too, copied into his Commonplace
Book long passages from Beccaria to guide future legal reform in
Virginia. '12
Beccaria argued, in the spirit of the Enlightenment, that the primary
aim of the criminal law ought to be reform and deterrence, not
retribution:
[T]he purpose of punishment is neither to torment and afflict a sensi-
tive being, nor to undo a crime already committed .... Can the
shrieks of a wretch recall from time, which never reverses its course,
deeds already accomplished? The purpose can only be to prevent
the criminal from inflicting new injuries on its citizens and to deter
others from similar acts.
1 13
Since deterrence was the goal here, the proper focus of the criminal law
was not the criminal himself, but "those who are the witnesses of punish-
ment," and it is "for their sake rather than the criminal's" that punish-
ment ought to be inflicted at all. Beccaria argued against the death
penalty for just that reason. Capital punishment was less efficient, he
said, than a life sentence "among fetters or chains, under the rod, under
the yoke, in a cage of iron," since the latter would "inspire terror in the
spectator more than in the sufferer."' "14 In short, for Beccaria, the treat-
ment of crime ought to be directed away from the individual offender
toward an infinite number of potential offenders. The criminal was
unimportant in and of himself: he was neither the embodiment of moral
desert, nor the recipient of collective vengeance. Only within a general
scheme of crime prevention would he matter. Utilitarian philosophy of
this sort was of course anathema to Kant, who set out to refute both
112. In Book IV of the Commentaries, Blackstone wrote, for example, that punishment is "not
by way of atonement or expiation for the crime committed ... but as a precaution against future
offences of the same kind," quoted in Richard Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge:
Harvard Univ. Press, 1981), 28 n. 35; John Adams, The Works of John Adams (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1856), 2: 238, quoted in Henry Paolucci, "Translator's Introductor" to Cesare Beccaria, On
Crimes and Punishments, trans. Henry Paolucci (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), xxi; Garry
Wills, Inventing America (New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 152.
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Beccaria's "sophistry" and his "compassionate sentimentality." '15
Yet, in the next century, it was Beccaria's philosophy, rather than
Kant's, that would come to dominate the field of penal justice.11 6 The
early nineteenth century was the age of the penitentiary, with its environ-
mental view of crime, its rehabilitative zeal toward the criminal, and its
grand ambition to achieve the twin goals of reform and deterrence
through the agency of the prison sentence.1 1 7 New York and Penn-
sylvania spearheaded the movement, and new-style prisons soon sprang
up: in Auburn between 1819 and 1823, in Ossining (familiarly known as
Sing-Sing) in 1825, in Pittsburgh in 1826, and in Cherry Hill in 1829. By
the 1830s, the American penitentiary had become world famous,
attracting visitors such as Alexis de Tocqueville, Gustave Auguste de
Beaumont, Harriet Martineau, and Charles Dickens.
In relinquishing its claim to retribution, the penitentiary stood as a
visible monument to the separation of law and morals. And yet, for all
its public glamour, the penitentiary was in some sense only a minor orna-
ment in a legal system whose center of gravity was clearly somewhere
else. Nineteenth-century American law was overwhelmingly economic
in focus, the bulk of it occasioned by the needs of an expanding and
industrializing nation. Laws regulated the enforcement of contract, the
sale and transfer of land, the granting of corporate charters, the authori-
zation of turnpikes, canals, bridges, and railroads. Distribution-not ret-
ribution-was the law's business in the nineteenth century, and, in the
complex reshuffling of filiations within the liberal landscape, it was to the
economy that the law owed its primary allegiance.1 18  As Lawrence
Friedman says, nineteenth-century law emphasized "the protection of
property rather than morality," and, for that reason, "criminal justice
and civil justice alike ceased to be concerned with the individual." 9 In
this climate, Kant's rhetoric about "bloodguiltiness" and "internal wick-
edness" must sound increasingly remote, increasingly archaic, though
not without its peculiar resonances. Those resonances are most richly
orchestrated, I have tried to argue, in the nineteenth-century novel, a
115. Kant, The Philosophy of Law, 202, 201.
116. Marcello Maestro, Cesare Beccaria and the Origins of Penal Reform (Philadelphia: Temple
Univ. Press, 1973); Leon Radzinowicz, Ideology and Crime (New York: Columbia Univ. Press,
1966), 1-28.
117. David Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and Disorder in the New
Republic (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary
in the Industrial Revolution, 1750-1850 (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1978). See also an
important critique of Foucault, Rothman, and Ignatieff, by Ignatieff himself, "State, Civil Society,
and Total Institutions: A Critique of Recent Social Histories of Punishment," in Crime and Justice:
An Annual Review of Research, eds. Michael Tonry and Norval Morris (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago
Press, 1981), 3: 153-92.
118. This position is most influentially argued in James Willard Hurst, Law and the Conditions
of Freedom in the Nineteenth-Century United States (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1956), and
Morton Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law, 1789-1860 (Cambridge: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1977).
119. Friedman, "Notes Toward a History of American Justice," 125.
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genre residually devoted to morality and residually centered on the indi-
vidual. In the richness of that orchestration, though, we hear as well
echoes not altogether Kantian. Distribution and retribution make virtu-
ally interchangeable noises here; so the justice that the novel dispenses is
finally a complex, multivocal kind of justice: a verdict not just about sex-
ual propriety but also about social equality, played out over the registers
of gender and class, polity and morality. In the middle of it all is the
figure of a woman, newly released from the path of the law and testifying
now under the broad mantle of novelistic justice. Her testimony, how-
ever, is not entirely about herself.
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